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Bank. :b\·h. 7, 
. EliGBXE A1'0CSTrXli: 
Appellant. 
Homicide~Evidence--Killing in Perpetration of Burglary. 
for murder ha~Pd on the that the 
in the (·ommissiou of burglary, tlte 
after down the door of a 
from the facts and ein;umstances dis-
defendant's threat to 
his u~e of a fence 
t'llLry into the house, 
the hou:oP, ;mch aR asking the 
man for a drink while still holding the post in a 
him on being informed that 
and striking; the deeeased, the 
JatPr having sexual intercourse 
Weapon.--A deadly weapon is one likely to 
or great bodily injury. 
Id.~Deadly Weapon.---A fpnce post measuring 4 f('et 11 
in length, 4 inches by 4 inches square and weighing 
is a deadly weapon where it may be inferred from 
eYidence that its possessor intended on a particular oc-
'"n~ion to HH' it me n wcapun sl10uld th(• eit'(·mnstnnl'('S require. 
Burglary-Intent.-Burglary is committed when a person en-
home "with intent to commit ... any felony'' (Peu. 
~ -159), and a pl'rsou is guilty of a felony when he com-
au assault on the person of another with a deadly 
weapon or by any means of force likely to produce great 
injury. (Pen. Code, § 2·16.) 
Robbery-Intent: Burglary~Intent.~A spPcific intent to steal 
essPntial dement of robbery, as distinguished from bur-
wlwre the crime is complete when the one accused has 
Hll(Tl'd the house of anothrr with intent to commit any felony. 
Cal.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery, § 10; Am.Jur., Assault 
, ~ 34 ct seq. 
Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 146(2); [2, 3] Assault, 
Burglary, ~8: llobhery, §4: Burglary, §8; [6] 
~ 15(6): [7] Criminal Law, ~ 1404; [8] Criminal Law, 
: [9] Crimin11l Law, ~1407; [10] Witness(•s, §133: [11] 
Law, §1377(4); [12] Criminal Law, §1382; [13] Homi-
268. 
C.2d 
murder 
of whether the person actually 
killed was the person defendant intended to and re-
oi whether the killing was intentional or accidental. 
Criminal Law-- Appeal- Harmless Error Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a murder case, misconduct of the 
district attorney in his voir dire examination 
uf the and during his that a person 
life sentence is eligible for and can be on the 
streets within seven years was nut prejudicial to defendant 
where unJer the evidence no miscarriage of justice coulJ have 
resulteJ therefrom. ( Const., art. VI, § 41.2.) 
[8] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-In a murder case, defendant was not prejudiced 
by the closing argument of the district attorney stating that 
the defense was trying to bring in by innuendo and by in-
ference things that weren't there, that this was not evidence, 
that the jury should weigh the evidence, and that the prosecu-
tion had given a codefendant the benefit of any doubt. 
[9] !d.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting 
Attorney.-In a prosecution for murder based on the theory 
that the killing was perpetrated in the commission of bur-
glary, the district attorney was not guilty of prejudicial mis-
conduct in giving an illustration of first degree murder com-
mitted in the perpetration of robbery, where his intent in 
giving such an example was to illustrate to the jury that the 
homicide committed in the course of such a felony does not 
have to be of the Yictim of the felony itself in order to con-
stitute the killing Hrst dPgrPe murder. 
[10] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Extent.-The extent to which 
cross-examination of a witness may be carried rests largely 
in the discretion of the court. 
[11] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Cross-
examination.-Alleged error of the court in limiting the cross-
examination of a clinical technologist concerning the alcoholic 
content found in blood samples taken from the deceased 
woman was not prejudicial where the evidence would have 
been only cumulative of that showing that deceased had been 
drinking on the day of her death. 
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Testimony of a 
deputy sheriff who arrested defendant was not prejudicial or 
inflammatory where he stated merely where he found de-
fendant, that defendant appeared to be sober or "slightly 
[10] SPe Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 76; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 620. 
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influence" of and that he informed de-
as to he was there. 
Homicide - Appeal - Harmless Error - Instructions.-In a 
for n1urder based on the 
in the commission of it was not 
that if defendant 
then deceased was not 
or attcompt to perpe-
where the court instructed the that every 
who enters any house with intent to commit any felony 
of that the essence of a burglary is 
with such specific intent, and that the crime 
as soon as the entry is made of whether 
intent thereafter is carried out. 
~APPEAIJ (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County 
from an order denying a new trial. John A. IIe~wicker, 
Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
H(nrard A. lVIuhleman, under appointment by the Supreme 
for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. TJinn, 
Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, 
Attorney General, for Hespondent. 
,J.-This is an automatic appeal (Pen. Code, 
from a judgment of the Superior Conrt of San Diego 
imposing the drath penalty. 
DefPndant Engene Augustine 1\Iorloek was eharged with 
thr murder of one ~Annie Moralrs; he \Yas also ehargecl with 
her and IYith assault with a deadly weapon ~with intent 
to George Piepa. He pleaded not guilty and not 
reason of insanity to all three charges. After trial 
he was found g11ilt;' as charged and sane at the time 
commission of the offenses. A motion for a new tria 1 
was made and clenied and a judgment imposing the cleat h 
\\"aS rendere(l. 
Thrre iR little or no dispute as to the faets. On ]\fay 11, 
Gm; Pico, George Pi epa, Prank Cnrrvas, <tefrndant 's 
144 C.2d 
uncle, and Annie :Morales were 
room dwelling on the Him~on Indian Heservation. At 
mately 7 o'clock in the defendant in the company 
of Lindy Parcel (a codefendant) broke down the door of 
the house with a fence defendant had up outside 
and .. which he used as a battering ram. He then asked 
for a drink while still holding the 
ner. Piepa informed him there was 
upon defendant struck Piepa with his fists 
the floor. The record disclosed that defendant \Yas 
4 inches tall and oyer 200 pounds. Annie 
the common-law wife of Piepa, came through the 
the next room and may have started to attack the 
He thereupon struck her in the face with his fists knocking 
her to the floor where he then kicked her three or four times in 
the face with his steel-toed boots. He left her on her 
back on the floor of the bedroom >vhere she fell and went back 
into the kitchen where he struck Piepa ·with the f1at side of 
an axe he had found in the house and then kicked him. 
Parcel took the axe a·way from him, but defendant found a 
broken bread knife with which he proceeded to cut Piepa. 
The knife was taken from him by Parcel. Defendant then 
went into the bedroom ,,rhere he had sexual intercourse with 
Annie Morales who had not moYed since defendant had beaten 
and kicked her. Frank Cuervas then, at defendant's invita-
tion, had intercourse with the unconscious woman. Defendant 
and Prank then covered the woman ·with a blanket and left 
after taking a bottle of wine from the house. Parcel testified 
that before entering the house defendant said he \Yas going 
to ''clobber'' Piepa because Pi epa had beaten his uncle . 
. A .. nnie Morales' face was crushed and her lips lacerated; she 
suffered a fracture of the skull. Medical testimony was to 
the effect that despite her severe injuries she could have lived 
from one-half an hour to several hours after the wounds were 
inflicted. Piepa, although severely beaten, recovered and 
testified at the trial. Defendant did not take the stand in his 
own defense. A transcription of answers by defendant to 
questions asked him by a member of the sheriff's office was 
admitted in evidence. There is no contention that the answers. 
were not freely given. The questions and answers thereto fully 
corroborate the facts heretofore set forth. 
'l'he People argue that defendant was guilty of first degree 
murder in that the death of Annie Morales occurred in the 
commission of (1) burglary; (2) rape; and (3) mayhem. 
PEOPLE v. MoRLOCK 
[46 C.2d 141; 292 P.2d 8971 
contends that the evidence 
the mnrder occurred in the 
; that the dis( rict 
miseondnct; that the conrt 
certain im;trnciions am1 in 
defendant. 
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who commits an assault npon the person of 
her \Yith a ·weapon or instrument or any means 
to prod nee bodily injmy is . . . " 
'fhe nudisputt>(l rYi<lence sho•xs that defendnnt 
into the house of Pi epa with a fen eo \Yith the 
HYowed intent to "elobber" Pi epa. Section 460 of the Penal 
( that any person armed with a dradl,Y ·weapon, 
while in the commission of such burglary arms him. 
a deadly weapon, or '"ho ·while in the commission of 
bnrglary assaults any person'' is gnilty of burglary of 
first degree. 'l'lle codefem1ant, Parcel, testified as to 
drfelHlant's intent to assault Piera before arrive(1 at 
's house. He and defendant (in the interrogator~-) both 
state<l that defendant armed himself ·with the fence ]!ost prior 
Piepa 's house. [la] In a prosecution such as 
the intent to commit a felony after bN•aking down the 
am1 ('ntering may be inferrell from the facts aud circum-
disclosed by the eYidcnee (People Y. 106 
.App.2d 528 [2!3G P.2d 402]) which includes defendant's 
to elobber Picpa, his use of the fence post, and his 
l:(!ndnet upon entering the house. [2] A deadly weapon is 
to death or bodily injury (People v. 
68 Cal. 245; People v. Leyba, 74 Cal. 407 [16 P. 200] ). 
v. Cook, 1G Cal.2d 507, 517 [102 P.2d 752], the 
deceased met her death by being struck with a piece of hvo. 
about 2 feet long. 'fhe court in the Cook case in 
that the t\vo-by.four was a dea(11:- wea110n quoted from 
V. Raleigh, 128 Cal.App. 105, 108, no [16 P.2c1 752]. 
follcnvs: "\Vhen it appears ... that [such] an instru-
... is capable of being used in a 'dang·erous or 
' manner, ancl it may be fairly inferrec1 from the rYi-
that its possessor intended on a TJ'1rticular occasion to 
11sc it as a weapon should the eircumstances require, lYe believe 
its eharacter as a 'dangerous or deadly weapon' may be 
146 PEOPLE V. MORLOCK [46 C.2d 
thus least for the purposes of that occasion.'' 
[3a] involved here measured 4 feet 11 inches 
in was 4 inches 4 inches square and weighed 10 
pounds, and therefore comes well within the definition of a 
'' weapon'' as defined in the 
Defendant contends that if this was a the crime 
was upon the ; that Annie Morales was, there-
not killed in the of but was killed 
in the of an Defendant's 
contentions are without merit. The statute Code, § 189) 
that all murder which is committed in the perpetra-
tion of or attempt to perpetrate burglary is murder of the 
first [4] As we have heretofore pointed out burglary 
is committed when a person enters any house "with intent to 
commit ... any felony" (Pen. Code, § 459) and that section 
245 of the Penal Code provides that a person is guilty of a 
felony when he commits an assault upon the person of another 
with a deadly weapon ''or by any means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury." [lb, 3b] It may justifiably be 
inferred from the evidence here that defendant entered the 
house of Piepa with intent to assault him \vith the fence post 
with which he had armed himself prior to the entry and that 
such fence post was a deadly weapon within the meaning of 
the term. Defendant relies upon the rule set forth in People v. 
Carnine, 41 CaL2d 384 [260 P.2d 16], where, in reversing 
the judgment of conviction, we held that an instruction that 
a killing was not first degree murder in the perpetration of 
robbery if the thought of taking the money from the victim 
occurred only after the termination of the attack, should have 
been given. Defendant's argument is, apparently, that he 
did not intend to assault Annie Morales when he entered the 
house and that he formed the intent to steal the bottle of wine 
after the assaults had been completed. [5] A specific intent 
to steal is an essential element of the crime of robbery (People 
v. Sanchez, 35 CaL2d 522 [219 P.2d 9]), as distinguished 
from the crime of burglary, where the crime is complete when 
the one accused has entered the house of another ·with intent 
to commit any felony. [6] It is immaterial to the guilt of 
defendant that Annie Morales was the one killed rather than 
Pi epa whom he intended to assault. \V e said in People 
Y. Coefield, 87 Cal.2d 868 1286 P.2d 570], that a killing is 
murder of the first degree by force of section 189 of the Penal 
Code, regardless of whether it was intentional or accidental. 
(See also People v.JJfilton, 145 Cal. 169 [78 P. 549]; People v. 
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more 
conviction on the 
ed in the commission of 
it is not necessary to discuss 
eoniention that the evidence was insufficient to 
tl1e homi('i(1e occurred in the of either 
\V c said in v. Chavez, 37 CaL 
672 P.2c1 632], quoting from People v. 
Cal.App.2d 238, 255, 256 [130 P.2d 495], that 
" ' Under the evidence, the might appropriately have 
appellant's guilt under any one of the three above 
theories of grand theft as deflned by section 484 of 
tlle Penal Code .... It was not necessary to require the 
to agree upon the theory If, under any one of the 
set forth, believed appellant had gained posses-
of and appropriated to his own use the moneys of Pacific, 
guilty of grand theft.' The same rule is applicable 
to various grounds upon which the jury could have found 
Chayez guilty of murder in the first degree." 
Defendant contends that the district attorney was 
of prejudicial misconduct in his voir di1·e examination 
of the jury when he made this statement: ''It [life imprison-
doesn't mean, as it does in some other states, that you 
arc ,:ommitted for the rest of your natural life. It means that 
a person is eligible for parole within seven years; within seven 
years can be on the streets. . . . " (Emphasis added.) 
'rhe district attorney then went on to inquire of the jurors if 
would return a verdict imposing the death penalty if 
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
was of first degree murder and found no extenuating 
cireumstances. It is at once apparent that the district attorney 
stated the law. The district attorney, in his 
argument again referred to the fact that defendant, 
a life sentence, might be able to walk the streets again 
within scyen years. In People v. Sampsell, 34 Cal.2d 757 [214 
813], we specifically noted that section 3046 of the 
Code provides that "No prisoner imprisoned under a 
life sentence may be paroled until he has served at least seven 
years" (emphasis added) but that whether such 
misstatement of the law was so prejudicial as to constitute 
e are of the that under the evidence 
that defendant could haYe been preju-
\\' e do howeYer, 
It is obYious 
more 
familiar, with the criminal law than 
rhat 1rhieh engages in the of criminal cases, and 
be said that a statement of the character made 
in this case was the result of mere inad-
vertem~e. If this 'were a case IYhcre of guilt 'was 
we would be to hold that sueh a state-
ment eonstituted prejudicial miscom1uct and justified a re-
versaL illc record before us, however, we are disposed 
to hold that the misconduct >Yas not prejudicial to defendant 
and that a of justice did not result therefrom 
(Cal. art. YI, § ) . 
Defendant contemls that the district attorney misstated 
the evidence as it related to the rape count since there 
il"aS no evidence that Anuie Morales was not the wife of 
defendant. \Yhile \Ye do not deem it necessary to discuss 
this contention be(•ause of our previous holding herein, the 
record sho>YS that Annie Morales had been living ~with Piepa 
for some years and does not show, or tend to show, that she 
\Yas the wife of defendant. 
[8] Defendant contends that the following statement 
made by the district attorney in his closing argument was 
"in essence, asking the ,Jury to find and administer the death 
penalty because of the fact that the co-defendants were let off 
and not charged the same as Appellant in this case; that 
they >Yere giving them a 'break,' and that they should not 
giYe Appellant a 'break' because the others were giYen a 
'break.' " It is contended that this was highly prejudicial. 
Apparently the part of the argument claimed to be prejudicial 
is this: "Now what this defense is trying to do is bring in 
by innuendo and by inference things that aren't there. I 
asked you if you would consider the evidenee, the eYidence 
alone, weigh the Court's instructions and arrive at your 
decision. As I will sho>v you shortly there are innuendoes 
that aren't this way or that way. That is not evidence. 
\Veigh the evidence and arriYe at your decision. Another 
thing, remember this: Lindy [Parcel] ~was given every 
benefit by our office when that complaint was signed. He was 
charged with one count. He could haYe been charged with 
the killing murder 
supra, 37 Cal.2cl 
ndicial misconduct an 
of first murder 
. Tbe obdous intent 
illustrate to thr that 
does 
it::df in order to 
V. 
ans1wrs ihis contention made 
contends that the court committed preju-
error in limiting his cross-examination of 1\Ir. 
teclmologit<t, who \nts ea1led by tl1e to 
opinion coHeerning the alleged rape of iuwie Morales. 
Def enclant sought to eross-examine l\lr. ?\akamura 
the akohol eo11tent found in blood takeu from the 
wonun1. The conrt snstai1ted au ioH on the 
that the aleohol l'OlJtent of the victim's blood vvas 
[10] It is, of course, \Yell settled that tbe extent to 
eross-examination may be carried rest,; in the 
of the conrt. [11] En•u if this were 11ot so, the evi-
\YOnld have been only cumulative since the record 
sbows that the deceased had been drinking on the day 
drath. the size of the defendant who was 6 
inehes tall and wc>ighed owr 200 pounds and that of the 
~wlJo \YHS ;) feet ;i inehes tall and 
further eYidence of physieal 
ou the part of (1efendant not 
']'here is no merit to defendant's contention that the 
of the depnh' who arrested i.lrfendant some 
hours nfter tlw eornmission of the was admitted 
pn•jmliet' <UHl inflame the mim1s of tl1e He 
~w]H>re he found him, that he to be 
"slightly nuder thE' influence" of aleohol ancl that he 
infonnec1 the ddeJH1aut as to why he ~was there. 
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the defendant contends that the court com-
error in to instruct the that 
"If you find that the defendant ... had not formed an 
intention to enter the dwelling of with 
the intent to commit a felony, then you are instructed that 
Annie Morales was not killed 
the to 
, P.2d 16]." The instruc-
tion was refused as No error appears inas-
much as the court instructed the jury that '' person who 
enters any house or other building with intent to commit 
any felony is guilty of burglary. The essence of a burglary 
is entering a place such as I have mentioned with such 
specific intent; and the crime is complete as soon as the 
entry is made, regardless of whether the intent thereafter is 
carried out.'' There therefore, no merit to defendant's 
contention since no error occurs in refusing to give an instruc-
tion when the instructions given adequately cover the subject 
matter (People v. Steccone, 36 CaL2d 234 [223 P.2d 17]; 
People v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676 [185 P.2d 1] ). 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are afiirmed. 
Gibson, C .• J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, ,J., and 
McComb, .J., concurred. 
Spence, .J., concurred in the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 8, 
1956. 
